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Abstract. The two-dimensional quick response (QR) codes can be mis-
leading due to the difficulty in differentiating a genuine QR code from a
malicious one. Since the vulnerability is practically part of their design,
scanning a malicious QR code can direct the user to cloned malicious
sites resulting in revealing sensitive information. In order to evaluate
the vulnerabilities and propose subsequent countermeasures, we demon-
strate this type of attack through a simulated experiment where a mali-
cious QR code directs a user to a phishing site. For our experiment, we
cloned Google’s web page providing access to their email service (Gmail).
Since the URL is masqueraded into the QR code, the unsuspecting user
who opens the URL is directed to the malicious site. Our results proved
that hackers could easily leverage QR codes into phishing attack vectors
targeted at smartphone users, even bypassing web browsers’ safe brows-
ing feature. In addition, the second part of our paper presents adequate
countermeasures and introduces QRCS (Quick Response Code Secure).
QRCS is a universal efficient and effective solution focusing exclusively
on the authenticity of the originator and consequently the integrity of
QR code by using digital signatures.
Keywords: quick response (QR) codes, 2D codes, smartphone security,
mobile phishing attacks, cryptography, digital signatures
1 Introduction
Quick response (QR) code has become one of the more popular two-dimensional
barcodes due to its inherent data capacity and higher damage resistance [1].
With smartphone security and privacy becoming a major concern [2], a hijacked
QR code can be a dangerous attack vector for smartphone users. With mil-
lions of QR codes displayed by companies in public places its not difficult for
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a malicious author to replace or modify them. The rapid pace of smartphone
adoption and usage [3] has not only enhanced QR code popularity and usage
over a much wider range of applications [4], but also introduced newer QR code
attack vectors for malicious users [5]; thus, posing a serious threat to unsuspect-
ing smartphone users. With mobile phone usage crossing the two billion mark
in 2016, outnumbering personal computers [6], this threat assumes greater sig-
nificance. Compared to the infamous 376 bytes Slammer worm that destroyed
millions of computers in the year 2003 [4], the maximum binary data that a QR
code can hold is roughly 2.9KB which can be a threat vector for malicious pay-
loads. QR codes can be used in several different types of attacks such as social
engineering and automated processes attacks. Automated processes attacks are
executed by exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities, command injection, as well
as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks [7].
In this article, we ethically simulate a QR code phishing attack to demon-
strate the attack methodology and the bypass method that can be employed by
hackers to counter safe browsing. In addition, we propose Quick Response Code
Secure (QRCS), a secure framework that makes use of digitally signed QR codes
to verify their genuineness.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain smart phone
vulnerabilities with respect to QR codes. Section 3 provides an overview of QR
codes and how it has been leveraged as an attack vector. Thereafter, Section
4 details the simulated attack using malicious QR codes, which demonstrates
how it can be leveraged as a phishing attack vector including the identified
vulnerable points. In Section 5, we present our QRCS solution which details the
components and the subsequent process used to authenticate genuine QR codes
by users. Section 6 provides a conclusion alongwith future directions.
2 Smartphone Vulnerability
Phishing is a difficult unresolved problem [8]. Since phishing attacks can be
made more convincing on smartphones than on a desktop browser, users can
expect to see more phishing attacks on mobile malware in the future [8]. At-
tackers create different kinds of malware to exploit devices for financial gain,
utilization of resources, information and data theft, search engine optimization,
spam messages, access private networks, or even damaging devices for amuse-
ment. Generally, such malware are attached to popular legitimate applications
or in new applications having some functionality to trick the user.
Mobile users put mobile devices in their everyday life using them for sev-
eral reasons like making phone calls, sending text messages and emails, online
transactions, accessing social networks, accessing corporate data, portable stor-
age, saving information (notes) and many more. These make mobile devices a
valuable asset to target for malicious attacks. Moreover, in US only 14% of the
mobile users have antivirus installed while 34% of the users dont use any form
of technical protection, let alone the four-digit screen lock PIN [9]. In addition,
the lack of security in legitimate mobile applications makes them vulnerable to
traditional attacks like SQL injection, cross site scripting (XSS), and man in the
middle attacks (MITM).
Several smartphone antivirus applications do not handle malware adequately
due to the limitations imposed by Android’s security system [10]. Hence, not all
antivirus applications are effective at preventing malware and spyware from in-
fecting an Android phone [11]. Furthermore, most of the antivirus software for
smartphone devices are signature-based; thus, making it impossible to protect
the devices from zero day attacks and sophisticated (complex) polymorphic mal-
ware. The subsequent sections explain QR codes and how it can be leveraged
by phishers, the simulated attack we conducted, the vulnerabilities we detected,
subsequent countermeasures, and our proposed solution to secure QR codes.
3 QR Codes as Attack Vector
QR codes, developed by a subsidiary of Toyota named Denso Wave in Japan in
1994, consist of black square dots arranged in a square pattern (matrix code) on
a white background. It can store 7,089 numeric characters or 4,296 alphanumeric
characters, 2,953 bytes of binary, and 1,817 Japanese Kanji/Kana symbols [12].
QR code has six desirable features, namely high capacity encoding of data, small
printout size, Chinese/Japanese (kanji and kana) capability, dirt and damage
resistance, readability from any direction in 360◦, and a structure append feature
[13].
3.1 Leveraging QR Codes for Malicious Purpose
QR codes are being increasingly used as an attack vector facilitating phish-
ing attacks and redirecting users to malicious websites that host malware [5].
Even though people might fall for QR code leveraged phishing attacks there are
other possible weaknesses that QR codes can possibly exploit [7]. Specifically,
QR codes can be used for SQL injection and command injection attacks in au-
tomated readers-programs that extract information from QR-codes. Moreover,
depending upon the type of data recognized and the nature of the application,
the decoding of QR codes can result in a phone number being automatically
dialed, a short text message being sent, a web page corresponding to the de-
coded URL displayed in a mobile browser, or a different application executed
[14]. In addition, the Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) codes
encoded in 2D barcodes can be used to wipe a phone, execute other system
functions, generate premium rate SMS messages, trigger vulnerabilities in the
reader software, the operating system, or a remote site, such as SQL injections
[15].
3.2 Leveraging QR Codes for Phishing
The most prevalent attacks employing QR codes are phishing and drive by down-
loads [3] that trick users to disclose confidential information. QR codes enable
users to open web pages via scanning, without typing the URL. Furthermore,
to improve usability some browsers in mobile devices hide the URL and even if
the browser shows the URL, due to limitations in smartphone screen size users
won’t be able to notice it clearly; thus, making QR codes a very attractive vec-
tor for phishers. In addition, some attackers use URL shortening mechanisms to
hide the true URL for tricking naive users. Regarding the possibility of exploited
sites, attackers can also direct users to malicious sites that can initiate ’drive by
downloads’ based on the fingerprint of the device. As the fingerprint information
is included in the HTTP header when a user requests a site (GET Request) [16],
the exploit kit retrieves the information about the device and sends the relevant
malicious code.
QR codes have been misused as attack vectors by social engineers via en-
coded malicious links that enable phishing sites to execute fraudulent codes [17].
Kharraz, Kirda, Robertson, Balzarotti and Francillon conducted an empirical
analysis across 14 million web pages to discover the extent to which QR codes
are leveraged by attackers in the wild. Their results showed that QR codes are
being abused by attackers to distribute malware or direct to phishing sites on the
public web [3]. The results not only revealed the malicious use of QR codes, but
also identified 145 malicious QR codes out of 94,770 QR codes. However, this
experiment was limited to QR codes found only on the Web and not in public
places. To demonstrate that QR codes can be used for conducting phishing at-
tacks, Vidas, Owusu, Wang, Zeng, Cranor and Christin [18] deployed QR code
posters across 139 different location where they found that most users (75%)
scanned the QR code out of curiosity or for fun, with very few scanned to so-
licit more information within the context surrounding the QR code. The results
indicate that most users who scan a QR code will subsequently visit the related
URL, even if the domain is unfamiliar and uses shortened style URL. A similar
experiment was conducted where the researcher placed QR coded stickers in high
traffic areas around a target town. When users scanned the QR code, they were
redirected to a WordPress site that informed them about the experiment,and
the dangers that QR codes can hide. [19].
However, our research not only simulates leveraging QR codes for phishing,
but also proposes a cryptographic methodology to counter the attack vector.
4 Experiment
In this part, we demonstrate and analyse how QR codes can be used in phishing
attacks making them a potent attack vector. Particularly, we start by creating
a malicious QR code and a phishing Gmail page, followed by the demonstration
of the attack.Finally, we bypass Google safe browsing to keep the malicious QR
codes alive even in case they are flagged malicious.
To support our experiment, we captured a photo of a QR code at a bus
stop in a city in United Kingdom (Figure 1) that we use in a way to simulate a
phishing attack. We can clearly see that the bus stop has an NFC chip, and a
QR code attached for commuters to check the time table electronically. In this
regard, attackers do not need any special-purpose tools to launch a phishing
attack neither sophisticated methods to trick unaware commuters to scan the
malicious QR codes.
Fig. 1. QR code at a bus stop in UK
4.1 Create a QR Code
The first step in our experiment was to create a QR code with a malicious URL
attached directing the user to a phishing site.
The requirement of a successful phishing attack is a domain name similar to
the original website for deceiving users including a link management platform to
hide (masquerade) our domain name. The latter is a common method to deceive
users in case a domain name is not similar to the original to keep the malicious
QR codes operational. In our simulation we used Bitly, a link-management plat-
form service allowing users to shorten a URL making it more attractive and
practical. Bitly uses the following format; http://bit.ly/.... Attackers normally
use such services as a masquerading method to trick people to visit the malicious
site. Since the shortened link replaces the original, users are unable to find out
the destination without first visiting the website.
Furthermore, some QR code readers allow users to see the human readable
QR code content (e.g. URL) before performing the action, while other code
readers redirect without this intermediate action. We have to make clear that
this is not a flaw of the mobile device but a limitation of the application software
itself. To demonstrate the attack we cloned and modified Google’s Gmail page.
4.2 Create a Phishing Gmail Page
In this scenario, we copied the official Gmail page people use to access their
email accounts. Furthermore, we deployed a web server to host our phishing
website and a database to store the credentials retrieved. In addition, we added
a descriptive logo of the public transport service company in the city where the
experiment was conducted (Figure 2 - with name of the bus company blurred
for anonymity).
4.3 Launch the Attack
We simulated the attack on ourselves (unlike a normal QR code phishing attack
scenario conducted at a public place). The browser will open and direct the user
to the phishing site. The unsuspecting user adds the requested credentials and
when taps the subsequent button will be redirected to the official Gmail page
without noticing anything suspicious. The simulated credentials are stored into
our created database.
Fig. 2. Phishing Gmail Page
4.4 Bypassing Google Safe Browsing
Google has web crawlers searching for malicious sites making the job of attackers
difficult, or not that difficult. Two days later, our page was flagged as deceptive
by ”Google safe browsing” feature. We hereby demonstrate how with only one
line of code, even this countermeasure can be bypassed.
The bypass method that can be employed by hackers is to change the name of
the phishing page. However, in reality, it is not convenient because the attacker
would have to change the URL in the malicious QR code. The warning pop-up
window alerts that “This web page at (URL) has been reported as deceptive
and has been blocked based on your security preferences” which actually means
that Google flagged only the actual phishing page (file) as malicious, and not the
domain name. This practice helps web developers to identify the compromised
page; otherwise, the domain name would be flagged malicious. Worthy to note
is that it is not considered best practice to blacklist domain names because
malicious domain names today may be benign after a period of time. In reality
the phishing page should be the first page someone sees when directed to the
site. A malicious actor can automatically redirect a victim from a blank main
page to the malicious phishing page with one line of PHP. Therefore, we use the
main page (for example index.php) only to redirect users to a phishing subpage.
The victim will still see it as the main page because of the following PHP code
(header(”location: test.azurewebsites.net/ test.php”)) which redirects the victim
automatically to the phishing page without Google’s warning message popping
up anymore.
5 Secure QR Code Solution
This section of the paper deals with the security of QR codes where our universal
QR Code Secure tool is presented which ensures that users get redirected only
to the intended sites. Since QRCS authenticates the originator by using digital
signatures our solution is a safe way to certify that the QR code a user scan is
genuine and not tampered.
5.1 Related Work-Security of QR Codes
Chuang, Hu and Ko [20] proposed a technique that improves data security in
data transmission during QR code communication. The secret sharing technique
divides the ”secret” data (QR code) into shadows (several QR codes) that are
distributed to ”n” participants where some parts or all of them are needed to
reconstruct the message. However, this secret sharing technique for QR codes
focuses primarily on confidentiality of data rather than prevent phishing.
Gao, Kulkarni, Ranavat, Chang and Mei [21] proposed a 2D barcode-based
mobile payment system, which uses QR codes to conduct secure and reliable
payment transactions using mobile devices. While this solution secures QR code-
based transactions it doesnt audit the integrity of the initial QR code the user
scans.
In addition, Narayanan [22] describes several non-technical solutions to raise
awareness of the security of QR codes that should not be overlooked. Interesting
is his suggestion of using descriptive features, such as logos into the QR codes
that would raise the difficulty to design similar QR codes, as well as the use
distinctive colors. Our opinion regarding the former is that this solution should
be avoided as hackers or even everyday users can use online tools to add logos
or change the colors of the traditional QR codes easily. As a result, a QR code
with distinctive properties can be used to easier trick people believing that this
code is coming from a legitimate source. Regarding the use of colors, Krombholz,
Frhwirt, Kieseberg, Kapsalis, Huber and Weippl [17] believe that the more com-
plex the color theme of a QR code is , the harder is to replicate it. Additionally,
they proposed the extension of these complex color themes to the whole adver-
tising campaign hosting the QR code. Futhermore, they point out the relevance
of digital signatures to verify the originator of a QR code.
Two encryption schemes for QR codes have been proposed that make use of
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography respectively [23]. For symmetric QR
codes the use of a shared secret key between the reader and the writer is used
with AES as the recommended cryptographic algorithm. The asymmetric solu-
tion makes use of the RSA algorithm to encrypt the symmetric key that can
be appended next to the message. It is worth noting that Peng et al. [24] pro-
posed the use of digital signatures for verification of the source before any action
is performed. Their idea to use a number of bits to identify the signers public
key is included in QRCS. However, the solution occupies a considerable amount
of space in a QR code that makes it appropriate only for specific purposes. In
this regard, we emphasize that the RSA algorithm may not be an efficient algo-
rithm that can be used in mobile devices. Hence, to minimize the computational
overhead, we suggest to use only small public keys (exponent e).
Accordingly, we differentiate our research by creating a universal solution
that can be used for the integrity and authenticity of any QR code for information
or transaction purposes.
5.2 Secure QR Code Solution (QRCS)
Our proposed solution adopts the traditional server-client architecture using dig-
ital signatures. The server side controls and authenticates the entities that wish
to access our platform to create QR codes under their company’s profile (can
be verified by the users that scan the codes), while the client is an application
available (like the traditional QR readers) for public use. Our proposed solu-
tion makes use of the popular hash functions and digital signatures to provide
integrity and authenticity to the QR codes.
Hash functions: QRCS makes use of the cryptographically secure hash func-
tion SHA-2 (SHA-3 can be used too) to generate a digest message of 256 bit,
which is currently resistant to brute force attacks. A hash function or better a
hash algorithm is a mechanism that can be fed with arbitrary length input to
generate a fixed length output. This property is not only significant for the use
of digital signatures if the plaintext is large enough, but also overcomes storage
limitations in the QR code.
Digital signatures: Our solution makes use of digital signatures, which is a
way to prove that a certain entity generated the message we observe, such as
the plaintext into the QR code. The cryptographic primitive is achieved through
the public key cryptography which makes use of the difficulty to factorize large
prime numbers or the discrete logarithm problem. Since smartphones have lim-
ited resources for doing heavy calculations we propose the ECDSA (elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm) for signing the hash functions. The entity that gen-
erated the plaintext and the hash will digitally sign the hash by making use of a
private key and an ephemeral key (the ephemeral key is different every time we
want to sign a new QR code). The solution we propose does the aforementioned
automatically to generate the QR code. Consequently, a user that scans the code
needs a reader specialized in decoding, decrypting, and verifying the signature.
Server-Side Platform On the server side we propose a platform that can host
our certificate authority (to generate digital certificates) and the registration sys-
tem. Since companies, organizations, or even small businesses can apply for an
approved profile on our platform, to illustrate the process we use a fictional com-
pany named ABC. Company ABC can get access to our platform by applying
and submitting the requested documents that actually prove their claimed iden-
tity. The approved entity will get authorized access, a unique digital certificate,
and can generate digitally signed QR codes.
Fig. 3. Server-Side Platform (QRCS)
In summary, a company ABC has to include only the plaintext needed to be
encoded and QRCS will calculate the hash function and digitally sign it (encryp-
tion with the private key and a unique ephemeral key). In addition, we make
use of Peng et al. [24] concept of using a number of bits to uniquely identify the
signer’s public key. As a result, when a code is scanned, the application identifies
the public key that is used to verify whether the QR code is genuine or not.
Client-Side Application Once we have a QR code created by QRCS it con-
tains the plaintext, the unique number which specifies the public key of the
signer, and the digitally signed hash. Figure 4 presents the client-side QRCS.
The application can access the public keys of the entities online stored into
our database, or they can be downloaded in the application for offline access in
case a network connection is not available. When a code is scanned the applica-
tion will check with the use of the public key and the signature if the verification
condition is satisfied. If it is satisfied, then the application will perform the in-
tended action; otherwise, the QR code is classified as non-verified. In case of a
non-verified QR code, the application will alert the user and the QR code will
be blocked from action. In addition, the user is able to submit a report for the
non-genuine QR code with details.
This option is available only for registered users who have proved their iden-
tity with a OTP (one time password) sent to their submitted mobile number
when they first registered. For example, if the QR code is available on the Inter-
net, then the user can submit the URL targeting the non-verified code. The user
has also the option to specify the geographic location of the non-genuine code
as well as the organization that the QR code claims to originate and are com-
pletely optional. These options are available only after a code has been flagged
as non-verified. Furthermore, a user can use the application without registering.
Fig. 4. Client Software (QRCS)
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we went through the process commonly deployed by hackers to
leverage QR codes for phishing attacks and subsequently proposed a client-server
based solution using digital signatures to authenticate benign QR codes from
malicious ones. Considering the rate at which QR codes are being deployed by
the industry targeting the mobile phone users, we believe that hackers are in-
creasingly leveraging QR codes as attack vectors putting companies and users
at risk. In this regard, our simulated attack using a compromised QR code
revealed vulnerabilities that can lead to unintentional disclosure of sensitive
personal information. Subsequently, we conceptually demonstrated our client-
server-based QRCS cryptographic solution using digital signatures that can suc-
cessfully thwart malicious QR code attacks at the initial scanning phase itself,
by digitally verifying the genuine QR code. Security analysis of our model shows
that apart from preventing users from redirection to malicious sites by the mali-
cious QR codes, our model is also effective against man in the middle and replay
attacks as well. This model is straightforward to implement as it requires less
modification from a QR code deployment perspective.
Our future work focuses on making QRCS convenient to use for both compa-
nies and everyday users by separating the application in security levels needed by
the interested party. Unlike companies, everyday users normally wont go through
a formal checking process. In this regard, our future work targets the lower trust
level zone in the application layer where user access is provided through a unique
email, username, password, and mobile number.
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